




A Form of Ethics: The disrupted and misappropriated story in the monodramas of Mark Ravenhill 
Sarah Grochala 

“to explain is to excuse, to condone is to forgive” (Browning p.xviii)

This paper will explore the politics of disrupted and misappropriated narratives in Mark Ravenhill’s monodramas Product and The Experiment. These texts, in which a single speaker tells the audience a story, were of initial interest to me because in the original productions of both (The Experiment at Southwark Playhouse in October 2009 and Product  at the Traverse in August 2005) the role of the speaker was performed by Ravenhill himself. Watching Ravenhill perform in both pieces, I had the distinct sense of him performing himself, the writer, engaged in the process of constructing a story for us, and highlighting for us the shortcomings of this process of dramatic narration. I found myself reading both performances as moments in which the writer, Ravenhill was commenting on the process of narration itself. 
The subject matter of both of these monodramas concerns harmful acts. In The Experiment, we are told the story of a man who finds himself involved in some experiments on children, while in Product  we are told the story of a suicide bomber.  This paper will argue that both these monodramas can be read as questioning the commonly held assumption that the dramatic narrative has value to society because it is a medium through  which we can come to understand both other people and the reasons for any harmful actions they commit. It will position the dramatic narrative as a structure which society utilises to judge the acceptability or unacceptability of people’s actions and examine the idea that the narration of a harmful act makes it more acceptable to us. It examine the ways in which the process of narration in the Western dramatic narrative, rather than enabling us to see the world through the eyes of Others, reconfigures the actions of Others within a viewpoint  that is entirely our own. 

Narrative and the acceptability of actions
Lyotard states that the narrative process can be seen as one of the ways in which a society determines legitimacy of certain actions. Narratives “define what has a right to be said and done in the culture in question.” (Lyotard p.23) Lyotard positions narrative as a form of knowledge. Knowledge, Lyotard argues is not purely a set of denotative statements of what may be considered true or false. Knowledge also includes the notion of competence, of ‘knowing how’ – for example ‘knowing how to live.’ As such, the concept of knowledge is not purely denotative, but is also prescriptive and evaluative. Narrative is a form of knowledge, not only because it contains denotative statements of what is and what isn’t, but more importantly because defines a set of criteria of competence. Narrative can seen as transmitting the knowledge of ‘how to live.’ The hero of a narrative’s actions represent a set of positive and negative models, which in turn bestow legitimacy upon social institutions: “Thus narratives allow the society in which they are told, on one hand to define its criteria of competence and, on the  other, to evaluate according to those criteria what is performed or can be performed within it.” (Lyotard p.20) Narratives legitmate and delegitmate certain actions. They define which actions are acceptable within a particular society and which actions are not. What is transmitted through narratives therefore is “the set of pragmatic rules that constitutes the social bond.” (Lyotard p.21)  
Dramatic narrative has come to be positioned as having social value because it helps us to understand the actions of Others, actions which might otherwise appear unacceptable to us. The modern play often attempts to explain the actions of its characters in terms of psychological causation. The actions of Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler, could be reasoned to be the result of her unconventionally masculine upbringing. At other times, characters’ actions are explained as the result of situational causation, the social and economic conditions of the society in which they live. Hedda’s actions could also be explained as the result of her position as a woman in a society that offers women an unacceptably narrow range of roles. Often a particular character’s actions are presented as being a combination of both these forms of causation. The dramatic narrative, it can then be argued, places us in a better position to prevent the occurrence of harmful actions in the future, as it helps us to identify the socio-psychological causes of these actions. By identifying the social-psychological causes of harmful actions through dramatic narrative, we are then in a better position to address the causes of these actions, and by addressing these causes prevent these actions happening again in the future. 
	David Edgar utilises this argument when justifying the sympathetic portrayal of fascist characters in his play Destiny, which examines the rise of British fascism from the decline of the British empire in the late 1940s through to the success of the National Front in local elections in the mid 1970s. Edgar states that: “The reason for making the fascists recognisable, and treating them seriously as human beings, was precisely in order to say to the anti-fascist movement, ‘You’ve got to understand these people. You’ve got to understand how it works - and this is how it works.’’’ (Wu p.123) Edgar is arguing that if we can understand the social-psychological factors that draw a person towards fascism, then we can understand how to combat fascism more effectively. In broader terms, if we can see the world from a character’s point of view, it can help us to understand the factors that have caused the character to perform a specific unacceptable action or set of actions. By following a character through a chain of causation, which ultimately leads them to commit an “evil” act, we can see how under a similar set of circumstances we too might choose the same path and commit the same act: a sense of “there but for the grace of God go I.” (Edgar, “In Defence of Evil”) 
Edgar proposes a another way in which the dramatic narrative has social value. It enables us to see the world through the eyes of the Other. By enabling us to do this, dramatic narrative, he suggests, may be a useful tool in the resolution of conflict: “Drama trains human beings in the unique skill of looking at themselves as if through other eyes. No surprise, then, that it is such a vital tool in working out how we can live together.” The dramatist is thus able “to invite the audience to see the world he creates from competing perspectives.” (Edgar, “Making Drama Out of Crisis”) The actions of Others, which we would find unacceptable at first glance, become more acceptable when they are narrated. The dramatic narrative universalises the Other, so that we can discover our equal status as human beings. Again the socio-psychological causes for the actions of Others are revealed to us and we see we too might commit similar actions, if we lived under similar circumstances. Therefore we are able to resolve our conflicts with Others, as we are trained to see the world from their viewpoint, as well as our own.
	In the field of social-psychology, the relationship between narrative and the acceptability of the actions it narrates is presented as highly problematic. In their exploration of this relationship, Arthur G. Miller, Anne K. Gordon and Amy M. Buddie note the large number of books, offering accounts of real incidents of harmdoing, that begin with a preface in which the writer of the account expresses a concern that to narrate these harmful actions is to somehow make the actions of those involved more acceptable to us. For example, at the beginning of his account of how a battalion of German reserve policemen were transformed into mass murderers during the second world war, the historian Christopher Browning offers the following disclaimer for the possible effects of the narratisation of their actions:
The policemen in the battalion who carried out the massacres and deportations, like the much smaller number who refused or evaded, were human beings. I must recognise that in the same situation, I could have either been a killer or an evader – both were human – if I want to understand and explain the behaviour of both as best I can. This recognition does indeed mean an attempt to empathize. What I do not accept, however, are the old clichés that to explain is to excuse, to understand is to forgive. Explaining is not excusing; understanding is not forgiving. (Browning xviii) 
Miller et al. conducted a series of experiments in which they aimed to determine if Browning’s concern, the idea that to explain is to condone, had any actual validity. In one experiment, the participants were asked to read one of a selection of descriptions of a harmful act, for example rape or domestic violence. The participants were then asked to respond to a series of judgment items, such as how forgivable or understandable the harmful act was. Half the participants responded after writing a narrative explanation of the situation and half responded immediately. The participants who had written the narrative explanation first were significantly more likely to see the harmful act as justified or caused by the external situation. They were less likely to label the perpetrator as evil. They were more forgiving and more lenient on the issue of punishment.  They concluded from these experiments that the act of narration, either as a producer or receiver of the narrative, produced a more condoning attitude. 
Millar et al. suggest that the act of narration tends to focus the subject on the socio-psychological conditions under which the perpetrator committed the harmful act. This creates a strong impression that “(a) that the perpetrators are, to an important degree, not personally responsible for their actions and (b) that the reader (of the explanation), were he or she in the same situation, might be highly susceptible to the same actions as the perpetrators.” The more complex and extended the act of narration, the more likely they found it was that a condoning attitude would be produced in the writer or the reader. When the act was presented without an accompanying narration, the tendency of the subject was to focus on a dispositional causal perspective, “attributing harmdoing to the perpetrator’s personal character.” (Miller, Gordon, and Buddie p.266) Miller et al. point out that both types of casual perspective are highly problematic. One does not offer a better viewpoint on a harmful act than the other. The dispositional perspective distances the subject from acknowledging their own proclivity towards negative social behaviours, while the socio-psychological perspective is unacceptable as it could be seen as offering a way to condone any action, no matter how harmful. The dramatic narrative can be seen as problematic as it offers a highly socio-psychological causal perspective. When a harmful act is framed within this perspective the attitude produced is more likely to be condoning, even if the playwright’s intention is otherwise.  

The Experiment
Ravenhill’s recent monodrama The Experiment can be read as an attempt to legitmate a harmful action through narrative. The monologue tells the story of someone or some people involved with some scientific experiments on a child or some children, which are being conducted in the hope of finding a cure for some incurable disease. At the beginning of the piece the speaker pleads “Please god: help me to remember,” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.2) indicating that what follows is an attempt to put into narrative a set of crucially important events surrounding a harmful action in which the speaker was involved. The narrative that the speaker produces for us with, however, is extremely disrupted, past the point of comprehension. The speaker is unable to deliver a dramatic narrative, which meets the audience’s expectation of being told a coherent story.
Dramatic narrative is traditionally divided into two elements, plot and story  In simple terms, story is thought of as a chronological sequence of events, while plot is the selection and organisation of these events within a dramatic text: “Whilst story consists in the purely chronologically arranged succession of events and occurrences, the plot already contains important structural elements, such as causal and other kinds of meaningful relationships.” (Pfister p.197) Aristotle instructs the playwright that they “should not compose a tragedy out of a body of material which would serve for an epic.” (p.30) When writing a play a playwright is traditionally seen as starting with an original or known story, and then constructing the plot of their play by selecting events from the original story and  organising them into dramatic form. The playwright assumes that the audience will be able to infer the original story from the plot: “story provides the foundation underlying [...] every dramatic text.” (Pfister p.196) The spectator is expected to use their existing knowledge of dramatic narrative to reconstruct the story for themselves. Similarly, as Brian Richardson states, our expectation as a member of the audience is that “a self-consistent, unitary story will always be able to be inferred from the events presented, regardless of the sequence of their presentation.” (p.59)  
The audience’s role, however, in generating the story from the plot is more active than is sometimes assumed. Keir Elam points out that the audience do not receive the dramatic narrative complete, but rather they play a vital role in its construction, particularly in the construction of story.
The spectator is called upon not only to employ a specific dramatic competence (supplementing his theatrical competence and involving knowledge of the generic and structural principles of the drama) but also to work hard and continuously at piecing together into a coherent structure the partial and scattered bits of dramatic information that he receives from different sources. The effective construction of the dramatic world and  its events  is the result of the spectator’s ability  to  impose  order upon a dramatic content whose expression is in fact discontinuous and incomplete. (Elam pp.88-89) 
The story is not something that exists as a consistent given beneath the dramatic text, rather it is an individualised construct within the mind of the spectator. Each member of the audience uses the incomplete information that they are given in the plot to build a story to which the plot refers. Obviously, all the stories constructed from one plot will not be identical, as each spectator brings their own experience to bear on this process. The story is an individual hypothesis created to explain how the elements of the plot relate to each other. Story is not a non-textual given, but rather “the structure of invariable relations shared by everyone of its existing or hypothetical versions.” (Pfister p.197) 
Jonathan Culler explains the process by which story is constructed from plot with reference to the assumption of Oedipus’s guilt in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. He argues that Oedipus’s guilt is a narrative construction as opposed to a definite fact. The witness to the murder of Laius reports that a band of robbers committed it, and Oedipus sends for the witness to confirm his testimony. As Oedipus recognises:	
If he says the same,
Still calls them robbers, I’m in the clear.
One man is not a group of men.
Plural is plural, not singular.
But if he describes a single traveller
Walking alone, then quite obviously
All the evidence will point to me. (Sophocles p.36)
But before the witness has a chance to recount his testimony, Oedipus decides that he is guilty of the murder based on other facts – the revelation that he is Laius and Jocasta’s son, and the Oracle’s prophecy. Oedipus takes the plot elements he is given and constructs the most logical story to connect them: “His conclusion is based [...] on the force of meaning, the interweaving of prophesies and the demands of narrative coherence.” (Culler p.174) This story convinces him of his own guilt, but his guilt is not a proven fact. It is a narrative construction.  The chance that Oedipus might be innocent is never actually dispelled. The witness of Laius’s murder never confirms if it was a single man or a group of men who killed the king. Like Oedipus, the spectator watching a play, bridges incidents whose connection is not clear, fills in gaps in the action and works to build a coherent story from the scraps of information, they are fed in the plot. To summarise, story is “a paraphrase of a pseudo-narrative kind, made, for example, by a spectator or a critic in recounting the ‘story’ of the drama.” (Elam p.108) 
The Experiment presents us with a series of plot elements, which both suggest the possibility of a coherent story while making it impossible to form a coherent story from them. The plot elements feel as if they should be connected because they belong to the same dramatic world. The objects described within the narrative act as concrete referents. The presence of a “bed,” a “house,” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.2) a “garden,” and a “fence” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.3) indicate a naturalistic frame to this story. to We are in a world that we recognise. The everyday nature of the objects indicates a familiar space. Often the text offers us only the broadest description of these objects, using simple adjectives. The house in which the characters lived is “big” and “old”. The child’s room is “lovely.” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.2) The lack of specificity allows the audience wide scope to imagine the objects as they choose. The object becomes a template onto which the audience can project images from their own experience. The house, for instance, could be a small cottage in a Welsh village, a terrace in South London, a Barrett house on a suburban estate. At the same time, the lack of specificity allows the audiences to make connections between the sections of the text. The house, which is repeatedly mentioned, could be conceived of as being a single house, or the story could refer to many different houses. It is both one house and every house. The spectator is able to connect these mundane unspecific everyday objects into a concrete individualised image of the world in which the action is taking place.
Whilst the text allows us to make connections between the objects mentioned in it, at the same time it constantly contradicts itself. The sentences of the text themselves contain contradictory compound phrases. The neighbour’s response to the experiments is “sarcastic mocking teasing furious understanding.” The weather is “hot rain.” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.5) The time span is “two three six months years.” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.4) Where an object is described in specific terms, its description is frequently protean. The image of the house alters every time it is referred to. Its size expands and contracts continually. At the first the house is “modest,” then it is a “great big manor” house, next it is “cramped,” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.2) then “big” (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.4) again and so on. It becomes difficult to maintain a constant picture of the house and so the social status of the speaker. The exact socio-economic conditions under which the speaker is making his decisions are unclear, so it becomes difficult to explain the speakers actions in terms of their situational causality. This sense of contradiction is also present in the description of the speaker’s actions. At times we are presented with three possible actions in response to one event, as if several possible choices of action exist at the same point in time. For example, when asked about whether they will agree to the experiments, the speaker states that I:
Was totally opposed
I understood immediately
I was dumbstruck, didn’t know what to do (Ravenhill, “The Experiment” p.3)
All three actions exist as possibilities in the audiences mind, but there is no indication of which action represents the narrator’s actual response. It is impossible to determine the narrator’s actual actions in response to the situation he found himself in. Thus it is very difficult to judge the speaker in socio-psychological terms. We know neither the exact circumstances of the situation he found himself in, nor the exact way that he responded to it.
In The Experiment, Ravenhill disrupts the dramatic narrative by making it difficult for the spectator to successfully apply their usual strategies for constructing the story of the play from its plot. In order to create any single coherent version of the story, the spectator is forced to make a tiny selection from a large set of possible events. There is a failure of narrative processes, both in the audience’s reading of the monologue and in the narrator’s own attempts to narrate their experience. This disruption of the dramatic narrative means that the speaker is denied the possibility of explaining the experiments on the children in socio-psychological terms, and the audience too is denied the possibility of understanding them in this way. This failure to explain the experiments in terms of socio-psychological causation suggests that this harmful act lies beyond the bounds of acceptability. There is an implication that the events the narrator refers to lie outside Lyotard’s criteria of competence, which define what it is right to do within our culture.

Product
In Product, Ravenhill’s speaker is a film producer called James. James is speaking to an actress Olivia, who he is trying to persuade to sign up to play the lead role in his latest film. In order to do this, he pitches the film to her, describing its dramatic narrative in detail. The film tells the narrative of a suicide bomber, a Western woman called Amy. Amy lives an affluent if empty life, until one day she meets a tall dusky stranger on a flight with a prayer mat and a knife. She finds herself drawn to his Otherness and they start a torrid affair. In order to win his love, Amy joins Mohammed’s terrorist cell. She betrays him, but then attempts to rescue him from prison in order to win him back. When he is killed during the rescue attempt, she vows revenge on the society that took him from her. As James tells her this story, Olivia sits with her back to the audience, responding silently to the dramatic narrative of the film along with us. 
In Product, the narrative of the harmful act is misappropriated rather than disrupted. Ravenhill provides us with an ill fitting situational causality for the harmful act he describes. This mismatch between the act and the situation exposes the political perspective of the seemingly neutral socio-psychological dramatic narrative. In an interview for the Guardian around the time of the play’s premiere, Ravenhill suggested that what differentiates Western structures of thinking from other ways of thinking was their narrative structure. He defines the difference between the IRA and al-Qaeda in terms of a presence and absence of a recognisable narrative: 
An al-Qaeda bomb, or planes going into a tower, doesn’t have a story, unlike an IRA bomb. That had a story, in that the IRA would say, "This is going to happen", then there would be a bomb, and afterwards would be a claim sayinga"Yeah we did it, and we want troops out of Ireland". That’s your beginning, middle and end. But with al-Qaeda, there’s nothing like that, they just do it. I think that’s one of the things that  unsettles  us,  because  we want a story.  So my  character  tries  to  give  suicide bombing a story. (Sawyer) 
The implication here is that the actions of a suicide bomber lack a narrative and hence, we find these actions difficult to accept. They cannot be explained satisfactorily from a recognisable socio-psychological perspective. I would suggest, however, that Product can be read as offering a slightly more nuanced  view of the link between Western culture and narrative than Ravenhill advances in this interview. It is not that the actions of the suicide bomber lack a narrative, it is rather that they do not conform to the socio-psychological narrative of Western drama. The two narratives, that of the suicide bomber and the Western socio-psychological dramatic narrative, do not define the same criteria of competence. They suggest different models of ‘how to live.’ 
Through his act of narration in Product, James the executive adds a Western socio-psychological narrative to the figure of the suicide bomber. As he describes the film, he makes us aware of this process by repeatedly flagging up the dramatic structures that he is employing in the construction of this narrative – the “narrative hook,” “empathy,” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.156) “inner conflict.” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.163) The common assumption would be that this act of narration enables us to see the world through the eyes of a suicide bomber. It helps us to identify with the Other and understand their actions. The narrative of the suicide bomber, which is described in Product, however, is misappropriated. It doesn’t help us understand anything. The suicide bomber whose story is told in the film is not Mohammed, the devout Muslim man who Amy meets on the plane, but rather Amy herself. Amy’s journey to becoming a suicide bomber is told as a incongruous mixture of romantic comedy and action movie, or as Ravenhill pitches it “Bridget Jones goes Jihad.” (Sawyer) The narrative behind the figure of the suicide bomber is shifted from the narrative of Islamic Fundamentalism to the narrative of the action-romance. 
James’s attempt to narrate the suicide bomber’s story through a Western socio-psychological dramatic narrative, highlights the extent to which this form of narrative is driven by a discourse of personal gratification. Amy is driven not by faith in a cause larger than herself but by personal desire. Her desire for Mohammed, her “aching” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.158) sexuality. This Western narrative of desire is flagged up to the audience through James’s frequent references to desirable consumer goods. This textual product placement, makes the film described seem like an advert for luxury products. James name checks “Gucci,” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.155) “Versace” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.156) and “Jimmy Choos” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.157) within the first few minutes of the play, and that’s only the tip of the iceberg. 
The dramatic narrative of the film seems to commodify everything in its path, including the narrative of other cultures. Towards the end of the film, James’s describes a montage of images which tell the story of how Amy trains to rescue her lover. This montage includes: “The Tibetan monastery where you learn to breathe and kick and chop. The mountain state where your Kalashnikov is slung across your breast ready to fire as the targets go flying into the sky.” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.174) The dramatic narrative of the film eats up and absorbs the traditions and practices of other cultures and uses them for its own purpose. It appropriates the narratives of other cultures and reassembles them in a Western form. This can be clearly read from the cultural misunderstandings that the images in the montage contain. The Tibetan monastery is configured as a place where violence is learnt, instead of peace. In the picture of her as a member of the mujahedeen, the mention of Amy’s exposed breast adds a sexual perspective which is out of step with Fundamentalist Islam.  The Western dramatic narrative, Ravenhill presents us with, absorbs, appropriates and commodifies everything in its path.
Ravenhill’s narratisation of the figure of the suicide bomber in Product  points to the idea that when we try to legitmate the actions of Others through narrative, we can only do this from within our own cultural context. Rather than understanding the perspective of Others, the socio-psychological dramatic narrative of modern drama recreates Others in the image of ourselves. It explains their actions on our own terms. The socio-psychological dramatic narrative does not help us to see through the eyes of Others, it only helps us to see the actions of Others through our own. We do not understand these actions within their actual context, we rather appropriate them and legitmate them through fitting them to our own criteria of competence, as defined within our own socio-psychological narrative. Mohammed, the authentic suicide bomber, remains as unknowable to the audience as he does to Amy, “a tall, dusky fellow” (Ravenhill, “Product” p.155) with a prayer mat and a knife. Ravenhill does not tell us his story. He remains Other. His actions cannot be condoned through the process of narration, and hence remain inexplicable and unacceptable.
Like the images in the montage, the story of the suicide bomber in Product is absorbed into a Western dramatic narrative and commodified. It becomes, in the form of a Hollywood film, yet another product for the Western consumer market. In Product, however, this attempt to acquire the narrative of the suicide bomber fails hilariously. The situational causality, which impels Amy to commit the harmful act of suicide bombing is comically inadequate. The attempt to explain the actions of the bomber through a socio-psychological narrative, albeit the obviously ridiculous one of action-romance, moves the audience not to understanding but to laughter. It fails to be convincing. Interestingly, the narrative’s onstage audience, the actress Olivia, does not share the laughter of the audience seated in the auditorium. She remains unimpressed and her abrupt exit at the end of James’s pitch suggests outrage as opposed to amusement. As a member of the audience, her silent response made me question the nature of my own amusement. It seems to me that this attempt to misappropriate narrative, and so explain the actions of Others on our own terms in order to make them acceptable to us, is a much more serious issue than the audience’s laughter at the story James tells would suggest. 
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